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Abstract: 
This study describes the relationship between two small and lesser states joining 
the German attack against Soviet Union in an attempt to recapture the territories 
lost  to  Soviet  Union  in  1940.  It  is  conceived  as  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the 
Romanian-Finnish relations based on the criticism of archival sources discovered 
in the Romanian, Finnish and British archives. Becoming “allies without alliance” 
almost overnight, the relations between the two countries acknowledged a quick 
shift from low profile bonds to an agreement based on a combination of balance of 
power and joint action. The aim was to remove the threat Russia was posing to the 
two  countries and  to  increase  their  influence  at a  peace conference  to  be  open 
following the expected defeat of their big neighbour. Romania was the advocate of 
closer ties between the two countries keeping in line with its search for influence 
rather than autonomy in its foreign relations, while Finland was more prudent 
consistent with its choice for autonomy rather than influence. 
 
Rezumat: 
Acest studiu descrie relaţiile dintre două state mici şi mijlocii care s-au alăturat 
atacului  german  împotriva  Uniunii  Sovietice  într-o  încercare  de  a-şi  recâştiga 
teritoriile pierdute în favoarea acestei mari puteri răsăritene vecine în anul 1940. 
Acesta este conceput ca o analiză în profunzime a relaţiilor româno-finlandeze 
bazată  pe  utilizarea  critică  a  surselor  documentare  descoperite  în  arhivele 
româneşti,  finlandeze  şi  britanice.  Devenite  „aliaţi  fără  alianţă”  aproape  peste 
noapte,  relaţiile  dintre  cele  două  state  au  cunoscut  o  transformare  rapidă  din 
legături cuo vizibilitate redusă la o înţelegere axată pe o combinaţie de balanţă de 
putere  şi  acţiune  comună. Obiectivul  era  acela  de  a  înlătura  pericolul  pe  care 
Rusia îl reprezenta pentru cele două ţări şi de a le spori influenţa în cadrul unei 
conferinţe  de  pace  ce  se  aştepta  a  fi  deschisă  ca  o  consecinţă  a  înfrângerii 
prognozate a marelui lor vecin. România a fost avocatul unor legături mai strânse 
între cele două state în conformitate cu linia sa de politică externă ce căuta să-şi 
sporească mai degrabă influenţa decât autonomia, în vreme ce Finlanda a fost mai 
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prudentă  în  concordanţă  cu  opţiunea  sa  mai  degrabă  pentru  autonomie  decât 
pentru influenţă în plan extern. 
 
Keywords:  balance  of  power,  joint  decision,  small  and  lesser  powers, 
Romania, Finland, World War II 
 
Introduction 
This study starts with a question that has guided two decades ago 
the research of Arthur Stein with regard to the “liberal” versus “realistic” 
assumptions  in  explaining  the  behaviour  of  international  actors:  why 
nations  cooperate?  As  Stein  noted,  in  an  anarchic  international 
environment, cooperation can only be understood in terms of interests of 
states. Therefore, in most cases alliances are transitory forms and adjust to 
developments  of  international  relations.  The  balance  of  power  theory 
stresses the paradoxical nature of alliances, which are concluded by states 
to  ensure  their  survival  through  concerted  action.  Other  alliances  have 
more than solely a symbolic value. They presuppose even a joint decision 
to  a  certain  level,  up  to  those  who  not  only  reflect,  but  also  affect  the 
parties‟  interests.  Finally,  there  are  alliances,  which  Stein  researches  in-
depth, which succeed to adopt a course of action favourable to their ally, 
even  if  it  conflicts  with  their  own  interests.1  Taking into account the 
occurrence (likelihood to happen) and the depth of cooperation, we can 
infer a “taxonomy” of cooperation: 
 
Two additional concepts must be integrated at this point. The first 
concept draws on a number of private and public references to the Finnish 
or Romanian “ally” or more often “brother-in-arms”. As this article will 
                                                 
1 Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate? Circumstance and Choice in International Relations 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 151-155. 
Fig 1 Types of cooperation
Alliance
Joint decision
Balance of power
Transitory 
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demonstrate,  the  beginning  of  the  military  operations  against  the  Soviet 
Union in concert with Germany made the unity of scopes between Finns 
and  Romanians  more  visible.  This  had  an  impact  upon  the  relations 
between the two states which became, as once Ion Stanciu has put it with 
regard  to  the  World  War  I  Romanian-United  States  relations,  “allies 
without alliance”. Although he does not conceptualize this expression, he 
refers to the relationship between two countries, the nature of which has 
unexpectedly,  in  the  course  of  war  developments,  acquired  a  new 
significance.2 In fact, this concept is to a large extent another exp ression of 
the  balance  of  power,  within  the  meaning  that  both  partners  want  the 
defeat of their enemy but no formal understanding between them exists. 
Another concept is “concert” or “concerted action” which is often used 
especially by the Romanian Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Mihai  Antonescu.  The  term  draws  on  the 
example  of  the  Concert  of  Europe,  which  was  in  fact  an  action  of 
cooperation  and  compromise  between  the  European  states  based  on 
balance of power in keeping the peace of the Old Continent. In a critical 
account  upon  the Concert  of  Europe,  Sheldon  Anderson  shows  that  the 
term is based on four principles: 1. Machiavellianism should guide policy-
making;  2.  the  political  character  of  a  state,  as  long  as  it  is  not 
revolutionary,  is  of  no  consequence  in  foreign  affairs;  3.  the  balance  of 
power keeps the peace; 4. the general peace holds when the great powers 
control  the  state  system  and  adjudicate  the  legitimacy  of  demands  to 
change it and the heads of state determine policy, not “the people.”3 Within 
the Romanian-Finnish relations, as this article will show, the term was used 
to encompass a combination of balance of power and joint decision as 
regards “the Russian question”. 
Returning  to  Stein‟s  concepts,  where  in  this  taxonomy  fits  the 
relation  between  two  small  and  lesser  countries,  such  as  Finland  and 
Romania, situated in the in-between Europe and caught in the middle of a 
gigantic conflagration? Did the bonds between the two countries, in the 
context of the outbreak of the Barbarossa Campaign, exceed the stage of 
transitory cooperation where they were to be found at the start of World 
War II? Were the parallels of situations and reactions of the two countries 
as genuine as it was often claimed in public rhetoric? 
                                                 
2 Ion Stanciu, Aliaţi fără alianţă. România şi S.U.A. 1914-1920 (Bucureşti: Editura Albatros, 
1992), 27.  
3 Sheldon Anderson, Peace and Change 32, Issue 3 (Jul. 2007): 303-304. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
Operation Barbarossa (1941) 
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Since this subject is still a white page in the historical literature, this 
investigation draws primarily on the archival documents from the Finnish 
and Romanian archives, from where one can understand the rationality of 
the main actors, especially of the political and diplomatic decision-makers. 
 
Allies without alliance 
The launching of the Barbarossa Campaign against Soviet Union on 
June  22  created  an  entirely new security  environment  for  the  small  and 
lesser  countries squeezed  between  Germany  and  the  Soviet Union.  First 
and  foremost,  by  the  nature  of  the  situation,  neutrality  was  outside  the 
range of possibilities open to them and therefore these states had to choose 
sides. Nevertheless, the Romanian Leader, General Ion Antonescu, and the 
vast majority of his compatriots had little doubt where Romania‟s national 
interest rested. By joining Germany and not the Soviet Union, one believed 
that Romania will align with the winning side4 and thus the reintegration 
of the provinces lost in 1940, Bessarabia  and Northern Bucovina, will be 
achieved. Some even dared to dream that the Vienna Dictate will be revised 
in favour of Romania. Additionally, not joining the Reich would have 
entailed the risk of German occupation because the possibility to stop the 
war at the Romanian borders was very slight. 5 While Romania lobbied for 
and officially entered the war from the very first moments thereof, Finland 
needed three more days to move its troops against Soviet Union although 
war operations on the Finnish-Soviet front started soon after the launching 
of the German invasion. In fact, in his proclamation of June 22, Hitler had 
already mentioned not only Romania, but also Finland among the powers 
joining in the war against Soviet Union: “German divisions [...] together 
                                                 
4 More used in the international theory is bandwagoning, a term introduce by Stephen Van 
Evera and popularized by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz describes bandwagoning as allying with 
the strongest power. Instead, balancing predicts that such an alignment would be dangerous 
to the survival of states and that instead they should balance against such power, Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Teoria politicii internaţionale (Iaşi: Polirom,2006), 176-178. The cases of Romania and 
Finland can more aptly be described by referring to Stephen Walt‟s case of states who align 
to a domineering power during wartime in order to take a share of the hunt at the time of 
peace, Stephan M. Walt, Originile alianţelor (Iaşi: Institutul European, 2008), 81-82; John A. 
Vasquez, The power of power politics. From classical realism to neotraditionalism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 254-255. 
5 Grigore Gafencu rightly asserts in an entry in his diary of 19 September 1942 that Finland 
and Romania entered the war against Soviet Union as a consequence of the Soviet 
aggression against them in 1939-1940: “the neighbouring states have neither the lust nor the 
capacity to attack it”, Grigore Gafencu, Jurnal, Geneva, ianuarie 1942 – 13 martie 1943, vol. II, 
ed. Ion Calafeteanu, (Bucureşti: Editura Paideia, 2008), 141. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
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with the heroes of Finland‟s freedom and their marshal defend Finnish soil. 
From the banks of the Prut River, from the lower Danube to the Black Sea, 
German and Romanian soldiers are united under state leader Antonescu.‟6 
Soon  after  Finland‟s  stepping  in  the  war,  the  Finnish  envoy  to 
Romania, Eduard Hjalmar Palin, called on June 27 on Vice-President of the 
Council of Ministers Antonescu informing him about Finland‟s joining the 
struggle  against  the  USSR7  and  expressing  his  country‟s  satisfaction  for 
having an ally such as Romania in the struggle for their holy rights.8 It 
seems that at this point M. Antonescu came to realize the benefits of closing 
the ties with Finland. He answered to this communication by writing a 
letter to the Finnish Prime Minister Johan  Wilhelm Rangell in which he 
expressed  his  country‟s  satisfaction  for  “standing  shoulder  by  shoulder 
with  the  glorious  Finnish  nation  in  the  holy  struggle  for  re-establishing 
their justice and their inalienable rights and for the defence of European 
civilization”.9  The  two  apparently  conflicting  notions  encompassing  a 
national goal (reintegration of lost territories) and an ideological aim (the 
puzzling expression of defence of Europe) will come to be used time and 
time again both in the public and in the private rhetoric concerning the 
Romanian-Finnish relations. Representatives of the Romanian government 
will express on various occasions their satisfaction that the Finnish Army 
was  fighting  side  by  side  with  the  Romanian  Army  and  defined  the 
relations  between  the  two states  as  brotherhood-in-arms.  The  interest  to 
develop the relations with the widely respected democratic state of Finland 
and to differentiate itself to some extent from the war of Great Powers is 
barely  concealed  in  Romania‟s  policy,  while  Finland  affirmed  open  and 
loud that it struggled for a Continuation War, separated from the Great 
Powers. 
                                                 
6 “The Führer to the German People: 22 June 1941”, in German Propaganda Archive, 
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/hitler4.htm (accessed September 15, 2009). 
7 When on June 26 the Finnish envoy to Rome Onni Talas had informed Italian foreign 
minister Galeazzo Ciano of Finnish entrance in the war against Soviet Union, he insisted 
upon  self-defence,  ideological  and  geopolitical  mean ing  of  the  struggle  insisting  that 
Finland  had  been  bombed  and  the  Finns  were  defending  their  territory  against  the 
Bolshevik Russia, which was the main enemy of Europe, see Ministero degli Affari Esteri. 
Commissione per la publicazione dei documenti diplomatici, I documenti diplomatici italiani 
[DDI]. Nona Serie: 1939-1943, Volume VII (24 aprilie 1941-11 dicembre 1941) (Roma: Istituto 
poligrafico e zecca dello stato, 1987), 303. 
8 Note of conversation between Mihai Antonescu and Eduard Palin of 27.06.1941, Arhivele 
Diplomatice ale Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României (The Diplomatic Archives of 
the Romanian Foreign Ministry, hereafter AMAE), Folder 71/1920-1944, Finlanda, vol. 14. 
9 Mihai Antonescu‟s letter of 28.06.1941 for Rangell, AMAE 71, Finlanda, vol. 14. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
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Therefore, becoming allies without alliance was just an occurrence 
that had little to do with Romania and Finland‟s foreign policy choices and 
much  more  with  Great  Powers‟  objectives  and  with  balance  of  power 
thinking. 
 
Heading towards a concerted action 
It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the  starting  impulse  for 
strengthening the co-operation between the two countries came up. On July 
1  vice-PM  Antonescu  approached  Palin  and  advanced  his  theory  of 
Romania  and Finland serving  as  the southern, respectively  the  northern 
wing of the anti-Soviet border. He conceptualized and explained his views. 
M. Antonescu underlined the fact that both countries had a vital interest in 
undermining the Slavic bloc. He considered that the long-term solution for 
weakening Russia would have to be modelled on the policy of Richelieu 
and  Mazarin  as  expressed  in  the  Westphalia  Treaty  that  shattered  the 
German bloc for a long time. In his views, both Finland and Romania had 
an interest in solving the Russian question to a degree that it ceased to 
constitute a permanent danger to their political and territorial order. Under 
this optic, the chief of Romanian diplomacy considered that radical means 
had to be employed in solving this issue: the disintegration of the „Slavic 
mass‟ and its division into areas of control (railways under international 
and  extraterritorial  regime  or  territories  under a  kind  of  condominium). 
Emphasizing  the  fact  that  Romania  and  Finland  had  an  interest  in 
providing  a  general  solution  to  the  Slavic  question,  but  particularly  a 
solution given with regard to the Russian territories around their borders, 
M. Antonescu wanted a concerted action of the two nations. The areas of 
cooperation in his view regarded the defining of the grand principles of 
struggle against Slavism, the adoption of a common formula for solving the 
Russian question, the prevention of the creation of strong Russian states in 
their neighbourhood and mutual support as regards their territorial claims. 
Starting from these principles, the Romanian chief of diplomacy sketched 
out  a  program  for  developing  the  Romanian-Finnish  relationship, 
including press and cultural cooperation.10 
These plans reflect the high hopes of the Romanian foreign minister 
that the war will soon end with the defeat of Soviet Union and that the 
resettlement  of  ”the  Russian  issue”  was  only  a  matter  of  short  time. 
Therefore,  he  intended  to  press  for  a  long-term  political  solution  in 
                                                 
10 Palin‟s dispatch no. 76 of 2.07.1941, Kansallisarkisto (The Finnish National Archives, 
hereafter KA), folder Witting C11a. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
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cooperation  with  Finland,  initially  designed  to  protect  his  country‟s 
security at the eastern border and eventually aspiring to acquire foreign 
territories. It is difficult to know what political unit that it might be created 
with  German  help,  did  M.  Antonescu  exactly  fear,  but  most  likely  the 
possibility of a German-Ukrainian rapprochement was not overlooked. 
Eight days later, M. Antonescu approached again Palin with regard 
to  the  common  ground  for  cooperation  between  Romania  and  Finland 
further explaining his viewpoints and stating that the real danger for the 
two countries was represented not solely by Bolshevism but also by Russia. 
Because  of  this  common  interest,  the  Romanian  official  produced  again 
detailed proposals for organizing the cooperation between the two states 
and requested a precise response from the Finnish authorities.11 
The  Finnish  envoy  reacted  positively  to  these  proposals  by 
emphasizing the fact that according to his instructions he was to strive for 
developing very good relations wi th Romania.12 He informed his foreign 
minister about Romania‟s proposals, also stating that M. Antonescu had 
already  informed  Germany  in  a  pro-memoria  about  this  plan.13  As 
anticipated,  the  Finnish  government  accepted  the  Romanian  proposal 
stating that it wa s  “firmly  decided  and  happy  to  close  ranks  with  the 
Romanian  government  and  to  pursue  a  concerted  action  regarding  the 
Russian question.” It was also emphasized that the Russian question was 
not only a great question of war but also a question of peace asking for “a 
concerted action of the neighbouring interested countries”.14 
Notwithstanding the Finnish positive reply, M. Antonescu insisted 
for clearer answers on the Finnish viewpoints regarding the organization of 
peace and on the cooperation between the two governments in preparing 
their respective peace programs. In the internal communication with the 
Foreign  Ministry,  Palin  also  insisted  in  favour  of  a  response  to  the 
Romanian proposals: “reserve is of course at its place but barely a reason to 
offend.”15  Nevertheless,  as  Asko  Ivalo  of  the  Finnish  Foreign  Ministry 
pointed to Palin, the Finnish government was not in a hurry to decide upon 
                                                 
11 Palin‟s report no. 85 of 10.07.1941, KA Witting C11a. 
12 Minutes of conversation between Mihai Antonescu and the Finnish Minister Palin of 
1.07.1941, AMAE, Finlanda, vol. 17, 6-7; Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (The Romanian 
National Archives, hereafter ANIC, Preşedinţia Consiliului de Miniştri (The Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers), vol. 344/1941, 2-3. 
13 Palin‟s dispatch no. 76 of 2.07.1941, KA Witting C11a. 
14 Note of conversation between Mihai Antonescu and Eduard Palin of 10.07.1941, AMAE 71 
Finlanda, vol. 14. 
15 Palin‟s report no. 96/85 of 21.07.1941, KA Witting C11a.  From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
Operation Barbarossa (1941) 
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its official position. This prudence sprang from the fact that the situation 
was  still  in  motion:  it  was  impossible  to  predict  how  much  of  Russia 
Germany would occupy and what the Reich‟s peace plans were. Therefore, 
Romania was to be informed that, in the Finnish conception, a precondition 
for Europe‟s well-being was the dismembering of Soviet Union down to its 
national  foundations.  In  achieving  this  goal,  the  Finnish  government 
considered  it  natural  that  all  the  countries  at  war  with  Russia  should 
endeavour for an agreement. The Finnish aims were not yet crystallized, 
but  Finland  strived  for  safe  borders  in  order  to  avoid  that  parts  of  the 
Finnish people will remain within the Russian state.16 Palin made the best 
of  his  instructions  and  transmitted  on  behalf  of  his  government  the 
determination to improve the relations between the two countries and to 
act  in  concert  with  the  Romanians  regarding  the  Russian  question 
especially in respect to the final status of this country in a future peace 
conference.17 
In the meantime,  M. Antonescu elaborated in mid -July detailed 
instructions  to  the  Romanian  envoy  to  Helsinki,  Notti  Constantin ide, 
reminiscent of the arguments used in the communications with the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry and emphasizing the Slavic, communist and nationalist 
Russian  menace  to  Europe.  “The  Slavism  and  the  Russian  nationalism 
continue to threaten Europe not only as spiritual forces, but especially as 
biologic forces”, wrote M. Antonescu. The influence of the Nazi ideology 
was evident in his argumentation. In order to prevent this scenario from 
happening,  the  great  Slavic  mass,  in  his  opinion,  had  to  be  divided, 
dominated and civilized. He revealed the danger posed by the creation of a 
big  Russian  state  or  of  two  Slavic  states  neighbouring  Finland  and 
Romania. Besides his proposals that Romania and Finland should pursue a 
concerted  diplomatic  action  and  support  each  other  in  their  territorial 
claims regarding Russian territory, the new element in these instructions is 
the  stress  placed  by  Romanian  politician  on  the  “spiritual”  cooperation 
between  them.  This  was  partly  the  result  of  his  strive  to  counter  the 
Hungarian  proselytism  in  Finland.  He  suggested  that  this  cooperation 
should  start  with  a  press  propaganda  informing  about  the  common 
interests and calling for the development of the relations by the means of 
visits,  conferences  or  economic  cooperation.18  If the cooperation against 
                                                 
16 Ivalo‟s dispatch no. Y61 of 23.07.1941, KA Witting C11a. 
17 Note of conversation between Mihai Antonescu and Palin of July 1940, AMAE 71 
Finlanda, vol. 14. 
18 Mihai Antonescu‟s instructions of 15.07.1941 to Notti Constantinide, AMAE 71 Finlanda, 
vol. 17, 10-13. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
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Russia found receptive ears in many political circles in Finland, albeit limits 
were  imposed  on  the  extent  to  which Finland  can  influence  the  victors‟ 
decision  on  “the  Russian  question”,  the  encouragement  of  Romanian 
propaganda  against  Hungary  found  little  audience.  The  most  Finland 
could make was to maintain the balance between the two contenders for 
Finnish  sympathy  although  the  mainstream  opinion  was  in  favour  of 
Hungarian kin nation.19 
It was by the end of September 1941 that the Finnish answers to his 
repeated  demarches  fully  satisfied  M.  Antonescu.  The  vice -PM  now 
considered the Finnish responses as testifying for the complete parallelism 
between the two countries with regard to their war aims. By now, the vice-
PM felt confident enough in t he cooperation with the Finnish side to 
approach  with  Palin  delicate  issues  such  as  the  Romanian  territorial 
program.20  He even confessed to the Finnish envoy that although his 
country‟s decisions on this topic had not yet been adopted, he wanted his 
country to acquire a zone of protection between the Dniester and the Bug.21 
Although no treaty was signed between the two countries, by now a 
gentleman‟s  agreement  between  them  came  in  force  regarding  their 
cooperation  in  view  of  re-settling  the  Russian  borders  following  the 
expected defeat of this country. This agreement may be reminiscent more 
of what Stein describes as understandings reached according to the balance 
of power logic. The main striving behind this cooperation envisaged the 
security of two states which only a several months ago had suffered the 
loss  of  territories  to  Soviet  Union  and  thus  understandably  wanted  to 
prevent  this  from  repeating  in  the  future.  The  possibility  of  their 
enlargement in the east was left open, whereby neither of the two states 
reached a decision on this issue. The convergence of interests or balance of 
power-kind of cooperation does not however encompass the full range of 
collaboration  between  Romania  and  Finland  as  I  will  prove  henceforth. 
                                                 
19 Silviu-Marian Miloiu, “Finland's views and political attitudes concerning the Romanian-
Hungarian clash on Transylvania (1941-1942)”, Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - European 
Studies 1 (2006): 105-119. 
20 In a meeting of the Council of Ministers of December 16 in which the governors of the 
eastern provinces eliberated from Soviet occupation were also invited, the governor of 
Transnistria (never before a Romanian province), Professor Gheorghe Alexianu, insisted 
that Romania should master this province forever, Marshal Ion Antonescu answering that 
“you must work there as Romania would have installed there for two million years”, Marcel 
Dumitru-Ciucă and Maria Ignat, eds. Stenogramele şedinţelor Consiliului de Miniştri. 
Guvernarea Ion Antonescu, Vol. V (octombrie 1941-ianuarie 1942) (Bucureşti: Arhivele 
Naţionale ale Rom￢niei, 2001), 490. 
21 Palin‟s dispatch no. 132 of 26.09.1941, KA Witting C11a. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
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Steps towards the joint decision model had already been taken and the 
evolution in this direction will consolidate in the following months. 
By now engaged in a war against a common enemy and observing a 
number  of  common  goals,  the  two  countries  closely  monitored  their 
international  and  domestic  politics  in  order  to  be  able  to  discern  the 
changes in the international and regional environment they may reflect or 
even influence. 
Romania  and  Finland‟s  position  may  have  been  akin  in  many 
respects, but they were different in terms of political regime, a fact which 
did not lack consequences with regard to their foreign policy. Finland was 
one  of  the  few  remaining  democratic  states  in  Europe  and  the  only 
democracy fighting side by side with Germany. As such and despite the 
war  restrictions  and  limitations,  the  bottom-up  influence  over  foreign 
policy was more significant than in case of autocracies such as Romania 
where the decision was taken primarily according to the top-down model.22 
In  what  Romania  is  concerned,  this  country was  ruled  by  a  military 
dictatorship whose shortages and weaknesses were not concealed to the 
Finnish  envoy  to  Bucharest.  Nevertheless,  when  it  comes to  choosing 
between Romania‟s political forces, he consistently believed that at least 
during wartime Ion Antonescu‟s rule was preferable to his democratic or 
right-wing opponents‟ for his energetic and wise conduct of foreign and 
domestic  affairs.  Palin‟s  examination  of  Romania‟s  domestic  and  foreign 
policy is consistent with these views. Thus, at the end of July he reported 
that no foreign policy alternatives were open to Romania if the country was 
to be saved from total ruin except for the one the Romanian dictator was 
pursuing. He also praised Antonescu‟s vigorous and determined defence of 
his  country‟s  sovereignty  and  political  and  economic  interests.  This 
determined him to consider that the general‟s deposition from the head of 
the  government,  which  was  discussed  in  various  quarters,  would  result 
into a catastrophe for his country. He was aware that even after Romania 
                                                 
22 In case of democracies, three main factors must be taken into account according to 
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polarization, the strength of social organization, and the degree to which societal pressure 
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(mass public opinion, the attentive public and issue publics) is also useful and can explain 
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had  managed to  reunite  Bessarabia  and  North Bucovina  to  her  national 
territory,  these  circles,  although  rather  heterogeneous,  were  taking  into 
account the necessity of ousting Antonescu from power. In many quarters 
it was believed that he was going too far in his friendship with Germany or 
even that he had turned Romania into a German protectorate. Even the 
positive outcomes of his policy were considered insufficient to justify the 
high price paid for Germany‟s support. Contrary to these accusations, Palin 
considered  that  Antonescu  was  defending  Romania‟s  sovereignty  and 
autonomy and that no alternative was possible to his policy.23 
The Finnish envoy appreciated that besides the former interwar 
political elite, Antonescu‟s main political  issue were the legionnaires and 
the  Jews,  while  his  main  support  came  from  the  army  and  from  the 
Germans. In  what  regards  the  attitude  towards  Antonescu‟s  regime,  the 
legionnaires were however divided into four main categories: those with 
communist leanings; the cautious who adopted an “wait and see” attitude; 
the conciliators prepared for a rapprochement with the acting chief of state; 
the  fanatics  committed  to  put  an  end  to Antonescu‟s  life  and  regime  in 
which  scope  they  had  formed  a  ten  men  death  squad.  The  latter  had 
already  made  attempts  to  Antonescu‟s  life,  which  had  determined  the 
general  to  surround  himself  with  heavy  security  forces.  Politically, 
however,  the  radical  right-wing  and  the  Jews  did  not  enjoy  sufficient 
support  in  the  country  to  really  endanger  Antonescu‟s  position.  The 
authentic political danger was coming, in Palin‟s opinion, from “the normal 
patriotic circles”: the intelligentsia and the interwar political parties where 
Antonescu was criticized less for his domestic policy and much more for 
his foreign policy. Many members of these circles were pro-English, pro-
French  and  anti-German,  being  also  driven  by  personal  ambitions  and 
envy. On the other hand, Antonescu‟s supporters were not always reliable 
and sometimes they looked as being guided by circumstances. Therefore, 
Antonescu‟s real support came from the army. The army‟s attitude towards 
Antonescu was exceptionally positive as he was trying to have the country 
cured  from  her  traditional  bad  habits  and  old  sins.  Antonescu‟s 
government was based on bayonets, assessed Palin, and this statement was 
underlined  by  a  diplomat  in  the  Finnish  Foreign  Ministry,  who  also 
underlined  the  affirmation  that  Antonescu  was  leading  the  country  not 
only based on Romanian but also on German bayonets; a very valuable 
                                                 
23 Palin‟s report no. 28 of 27.07.1941, Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto (The Archives of the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry, hereafter UA), folder 5, C 14. From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
Operation Barbarossa (1941) 
 
  260 
support in time of war, yet a very narrow basis for a government during 
peacetime.24 
How did Antonescu come to support a German orientation of 
Romania‟s  politics?  Palin  fully  realized  the  influence  of  the  political 
domestic and international environment in this respect. Initially, Antonescu 
was not an admirer of Germany, a country against which he had struggled 
during  the  First  World  War.  As  in  the  case  of  many  Romanians,  his 
sympathy  went  to  France  and  Britain,  countries  to  which  he  had  been 
appointed  military  attaché.  As  late  as  September  1939  the  general  was 
deeply pessimistic of Germany‟s chances of victory in the war. He quoted 
Antonescu  as  arguing  to  a  foreign  diplomat  in  Bucharest  that  “even  if 
Germany will manage to conquer the entire Europe, and even if she would 
achieve the occupation of the British Archipelago, in the end she would 
nevertheless be defeated.” The Finnish minister believed that it was in the 
summer  of  1940  when  Antonescu  came  to  realize  that  Romania  had  no 
alternative to be saved from a total collapse then by joining wholeheartedly 
to Germany, ask this power‟s support and pay the price. Taking advantage 
of this situation, the Germans forced Antonescu into economic and political 
concessions to which he was prepared to consent given the circumstances. 
This  made  him  totally  bound  to  Germany,  a  line  he  followed 
“straightforward and with frankness”. As an ally and a trusted man of the 
Axis,  he  was  prepared  to  cooperate  with  the  Reich  in  all  fields. 
Nevertheless,  Antonescu  was  trying  to  preserve  as  much  as  possible  of 
Romania‟s  sovereignty  and  autonomy.  Palin  showed  his  approval  of 
Antonescu‟s leadership when writing to his Foreign Minister that “it would 
be desirable that he gets support in his hard work in order to bring about 
truly positive and permanent outcomes. He would deserve it.”25 
Looking  from  Germany‟s  perspective,  Palin  noticed  that  the 
German  bayonets  had  not  always  been  behind  Antonescu.  At  the 
beginning, the Reich‟s favourites were the legionnaires. It was only when 
Germany  understood  that  they  lacked  the  capacity  of  governing  the 
country spreading around confusion and chaos that Hitler had withdrawn 
its  support  for  them.  Yet  the  Finnish  minister  emphasized  the  very 
important fact that Germany was preserving the legionnaires in its back 
pocket as a lever on the Romanian government. Berlin‟s interest was the 
prevalence of tranquillity and organization in the country so that she can 
get from Romania what she needed. Antonescu was able to deliver capacity 
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of leadership and trust. The German envoy Manfred von Killinger proved 
this when declaring that “in this country there is not any other man but 
Antonescu  able  to  maintain  the  order  here.  He  is  wise,  energetic  and 
honest.”26 Palin also recalled the fact that Antonescu was put in charge with 
the  Romanian  front,  nominally  also  leading  the  German  armies  present 
there, so that the victories gained on that area to be attributed to him.27 
The  Finnish  envoy  was  thus  aware  of  the  autonomy  versus 
influence dilemma of small and lesser states and observed that while trying 
to preserve as much as possible of its autonomy, Romania was first and 
foremost concerned of gaining influence. On the other hand, he understood 
Germany‟s  ability  to  use  Romania‟s  domestic  rifts  in  order  to  divide  et 
impera. 
Perhaps little aware of the consistent recent history of Romania‟s 
relations  with  France  and  Britain,  Palin  did  not  conceal  his  surprise  to 
discover  that  numerous  Romanians  were  still  sincerely  pro-Western.  He 
described  the  split  between  the  governmental  circles.  Here  he  found 
determination to create and root in the Romanian society the feelings of 
friendship towards Germany and the press contributed to a large extent 
writing extensively about the friendship, the virtues and the importance as 
brother-in-arms of the Germans, on the one hand, and the popular feeling 
which ran against the Reich, on the other hand. Although he asserted that a 
change in the people‟s sentiments toward Germany did take place within 
certain limits, “at the bottom of their heart the sentiment in this country is 
of friendship to the Western countries and of suspicion, not to say hate, to 
Germany”. He looked convinced that many efforts were still needed before 
that will change. 28 
The Finnish envoy contrasted Romanian public‟s reserve towards 
Germany  with  its sympathy  toward Finland.  He  admitted  to  have  been 
touched by the Romanian‟s satisfaction that they were allies with the Finns. 
He concluded that “our nation and army enjoy the highest consideration 
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both at the topmost official circles and within the population at large and, if 
at all possible, of an even greater sympathy, respect and admiration than 
those  which  marked  the  Finnish-Romanians  relations  during  the  Winter 
War”. In the official  circles, Palin found concern with the concluding of 
peace and desire that Romania will prepare a peace program in cooperation 
with  Finland.29  The Finnish minister thus underlined the empathy and 
solidarity between two small and lesser powers with a similar recent 
history and sharing many common aspirations in the war. 
Gradually, the balance of power-kind of cooperation between the 
two states based on the old Arabic and Chinese saying that the enemy of 
my  enemy  is  my  friend  acquired  a  deeper  significance  with  the 
development of the political, diplomatic, cultural30, military and to some 
extent of the commercial relations. A proof in this regard is the first 
dispatch of the Finnish envoy Notti Constantinide of August 4 when he 
handed his credentials to the President of Finland in a 20 minute long 
audience. Because the reopening of th e Romanian Legation came shortly 
after the two countries became allies  sui  generis,  the  significance  of  this 
moment  cannot  be  exaggerated.  The  fact  that  President  Risto  Ryti 
designated  the  Romanians  as  “brothers-in-arms”  and  showed  a  marked 
interest  for  the  situation  in  which  Bessarabia  was  found  when  it  was 
recaptured  from  Soviet  Union  was  not  meaningless,  but  invited  to 
comparisons with the fate of Karelia when retaken by Finnish troops. The 
Finnish chief of state also paid a special interest to Romania‟s economic 
situation,  encouraging  the  strengthening  of  the  economic  and  cultural 
bonds between the two nations in addition to their military relations. This 
was perhaps the result of Finnish interest in opening new outlets for its 
products and of finding new possibilities of cereals provisions when the 
traditional  markets  had  now  been  closed.  The  reception  impressed 
Constantinide who pointed to the cordial atmosphere during the ceremony 
and  the  special  significance  given  to  his  audience  scheduled  three  days 
after his arrival in Helsinki, a fact also stressed by the Finnish director of 
protocol. In his dispatch, Constantinide emphasized the fact that Romania 
had uninterruptedly maintained a military attaché accredited to Helsinki, 
meant to pinpoint to the continuity of the relations between the two states 
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despite Antonescu government‟s decision of autumn 1940 to close down 
the Romanian Legation in Helsinki.31 
The Romanian envoy also enjoyed a very cordial reception at the 
Finnish foreign minister Rolf Witting. W itting not only granted him an 
hour long audience but also invited him to his villa. With this occasion, the 
Finnish  chief  of  diplomacy  approved  unreservedly  the  Romanian 
viewpoint that Finland and Romania had a common interest in the division 
of Russia an d the prevention of any big states being formed in their 
neighborhood. He also expressed his desire for a common political action 
to  be  pursued  by  the  two  states  by  reciprocally  informing  about  the 
changes of situations of interest to them and adopting com mon attitudes 
whenever the circumstances will be favourable, for instance if the two 
states  will  be  offered  excessive  territorial  enlargement  or  unwanted 
exchanges of population.32 Thus, the cooperation between the two states 
was already moving towards a closer convergence of interests, which was 
a line in their gentlemen‟s agreement and a step forward towards some 
kind of joint decision during wartime.  
The first part of the war which acknowledged, although with great 
losses, the retaking of their lost territories in the east and moved the war on 
the territory of the USSR was a time of high hopes for an early end of the 
conflict,  with  Romania  and  Finland  finally  ending  up  on  the  victorious 
side. In such circumstances, Romania wanted to increase its influence with 
the  Reich  in  pursuing  the  maximization  of  its  gains  at  the  forthcoming 
peace  as  Walt  has  put  it.  The  Romanian  press  reflected  the  leadership 
views.  The  assessment  was  optimistic,  full  of  praise  for  the  Romanian 
Army, its leader, now Marshal Antonescu, and the German allies. The press 
also pointed to Romania‟s struggle against Bolshevism.33 At this point, the 
Finnish envoy shared Romanians‟ optimistic assessments. Commenting on 
August 12 on Romanian war aims, Palin remarked that the recapture of 
Bessarabia  and  Northern  Bucovina  may  be  counted  among  the  certain 
outcomes of the war. He was convinced that it was also righteous as the 
two  provinces  constituted  from  an  ethnographic,  historical  and strategic 
point of view a part of this country. However, Romania faced a difficult 
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task in reconstructing these potentially rich provinces because of the fact 
that Soviet occupiers had dilapidated them. 34 
Nevertheless, Palin believed that the Romanians will not be content 
with the reintegration of these provinces if they were to finish the war on 
the winning side. There were two views in this regard. The governmental 
circles considered that Romania should also acquire Transnistria35, a region 
populated  by  a  sizable  minority  of  Romanians  and  Germans.  To 
counterbalance these views, the opposition circles were of the opinion that 
Romania should be content with Dniester as its eastern border but should 
attempt to regain those areas of Transylvania annexed by Hungary in the 
previous year. The Finnish envoy refused to believe that any of these hopes 
had on the short-range any chance of being achieved. In order to assess the 
significance  of  Palin‟s  commentaries  it  will  be  important  to  know  the 
source  of  the  Finnish  envoy‟s  information.  As  he  confesses,  this  was 
nothing  more  than  his  impression  (vaikutelma)  derived  from  private 
interviews  with  Romanian  decision-makers  and  their  opponents,  from 
official  discourses  and  from  reading  the  press “in-between  rows”.  Palin 
also commented on Romania‟s general war objectives regarding Russia and 
observed that they envisaged a division of Russia based on ethnic grounds 
and “the creation of a situation in which the eastern threat would be as 
small and as remote as possible”. Additionally, Romania aspired to war 
reparations and to the achievement of a status corresponding to the new 
importance of the country.36  
Consequently, the beginning of the military operations against the 
Soviet Union in concert with Germany made more visible the unity of 
scopes  between  Finns  and  Romanians.  This  had  an  impa ct  upon  the 
relations between the two  “allies without alliance”. The following pages 
will describe the progresses in the relations between the two states leading 
in  some  areas  to  the  acknowledgement  of  the  joint  decision  agreement 
which  was  however  never  achieved  due  to  war  developments.  In  the 
meantime, the mutual interest of raising their reciprocal representation in 
the partner country increased. No wonder that the Romanian government 
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attempted  to  have  a  more  visible  presence  in  Helsinki  not  only 
diplomatically, but also politically, culturally and economically.  
The understanding between the two countries was not always as 
smooth as officially proclaimed. In a dispatch to Palin, the general secretary 
of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Aaro Pakaslahti, countered the complaints 
he had received from the Romanian partners, i.e. that Constantinide was 
kept  uninformed  about  the  Finnish  views  of  the  international  situation, 
with the argument that the Finnish part was sharing with the Romanian 
minister all information he wanted to get. Pakaslahti pointed out to the 
British  demarches  in  Helsinki  about  which  extensive  and  reliable 
information was given to Constantinide. The Finnish diplomat recalled the 
Finnish decision adopted at highest level to keep the relation with Romania 
warm.37 On the other hand, in mid -September, Constantinide complained 
about the lack of news regarding the state of affairs in Romania for two 
months already, therefore reaching an impossibility to shed light even on 
the  most  elementary  developme nts  of  his  country.  He  was  also  in 
impossibility to listen to the broadcasts of Radio Romania. He asked that 
the Official Gazette and the main journals published in his country to be 
delivered by plane to Helsinki in order to keep him updated.38 
No such complaints are to be ever found in Palin‟s dispatches. For 
instance, he was familiar not only with the domestic or foreign policy of the 
country, but also with the progress of the Romanian troops on the eastern 
front.39 He approached for the first time on July 21 the issue of whether or 
not Romania was going to continue the war on the eastern banks of the 
Dniester. He passed on the information he got from a trustful military 
attaché according to which Romania will stop at the Dniester 40, which was 
in fact what many ordinary Romanians also believed. As a matter of fact, 
this issue will create a deep division between the government and former 
political elite around the National Peasant and National Liberal parties 41 
and even inside the governmental or army leading circles. 
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38 Constantinide‟s telegram no. 13/71 of 18.09.1941 to Mihai Antonescu, AMAE 71 Finlanda, 
vol. 14. 
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The German attack on Russia made it a matter of realism that the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  Soviet  Union  shall  join  ranks  against  their 
common enemy. Although the alliance will construct on an anti-German 
basis42, the little European countries that join ed Germany in the attack 
against Soviet Union came to be considered enemies of both nations. The 
grouping  of  Finland  and  Romania  alongside  the  Axis  in  contrasting 
coalitions to the allies of the USSR, Great Britain and the US, blew up their 
relations. An official Finnish communiqué announced on July 30 that the 
diplomatic relations between Finland and the UK had been severed and 
enumerated  the  British  actions  starting  with  1940  against  the  Finnish 
maritime interests, which had reached the stage of a blockade in the second 
half of the year. On August 1 the press also announced that British planes 
had attacked the harbours of Kirkkoniemi, Petsamo and Liinahamari.43 
The process of breaking up of the relationship was nevertheless 
painful. The Romanian envoy ascer tained from his conversations with 
Finnish businessmen or traders the dominant role England had played in 
the Finnish economic life. Two quarters of the meat and grain consumed in 
Finland were imported from the UK. On the other hand, the breach of the 
relationship with Britain allowed Germany to consolidate her position in 
Finland, further cemented by the common fight against Russia, the much 
hated and feared enemy. Regarding the role assigned to Finland in the 
north  of  Europe,  Constantinide  quoted  an  artic le  published  by 
Diplomatisch-politische Information that had a profound and lasting echo in 
the  region.  The  article  concluded  that  by  her  participation  in  the  war 
Finland had assumed the leading role in Scandinavia. Finland was thus not 
a member of the group of “stubborn neutral countries” and to reward it, 
Germany promised to have high regard of its national ideals: therefore, its 
aspirations in Eastern Karelia were to be fulfilled. An article with similar 
conclusions  was  published  by  Essener  Nationalzeitung  and  by  the  semi-
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official  paper  of  the  NSDAP‟s  Hanover‟s  branch  Niedersächsische 
Tageszeitung. The former newspaper openly stated that Sweden had lost the 
unique chance of preserving its leading position in the north. This positive 
attitude  toward  Finland  and  the  criticism  of  Sweden  was  echoed  in  the 
diplomatic  circles.  The  Romanian  envoy  reported  the  declaration  of  a 
member of the German Legation in Stockholm according to which Sweden 
had transformed itself into an asylum of German enemies.44 
Both Sweden and Finland reacted negatively to these appraisals and 
suggestions. The Swedish PM Per Albin Hansson and the former PM and 
chief  of  diplomacy  Rickard  Sandler  stated  that  Sweden  had  done 
everything it could for Finland, however preserving its neutrality. It  was 
exactly the status of neutrality that enabled the Swedes to support Finland, 
as  the  Swedish  defence  minister  emphasized.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
realistically assessing their political and economic situation, the Finnish 
government rejected such suggestions. Ryti unambiguously declared to the 
press that “Finland is not a Great Power and does not seek to acquire such 
a position. The feeling of unity will always be characteristic of our attitude 
towards the Nordic states and Finland wants no change in this.”45 This was 
a new statement regarding Finland‟s choice for autonomy rather than an 
influence in its foreign policy. 
Witting  also  confirmed  to  Constantinide  that  all  Finland  wanted 
from its participation in the war was the creation of a state whose borders 
will be easier to defend by fixing them on natural obstacles. That might 
make necessary the occupation of southern Karelia but not of St. Petersburg 
or of its surrounding areas. The Romanian envoy commented that Finland 
had  a  high  regard  for  the  future,  even  for  the  distant  future,  and  thus 
wanted to avoid anything that might worsen the relations with Scandinavia 
or  post-war  Russia.  Finland  wanted  cooperation  with  the  Scandinavian 
states  and  envisaged  with  regard  to  Russia  the  incorporation  of  those 
territories inhabited predominantly by the Finns but not more than that.46 
The position of the government was challenged only by the nationalists 
and their journal Ajan Suunta, an adept of Greater Finland with a leading 
position  in  Scandinavia.  Yet,  although  in  the  future  this  current  was 
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considered capable of playing a doctrinaire if not a political role, it had a 
limited influence and lacked both important personalities and popularity.47 
Indeed,  as  Constantinide  interpreted  it,  the  strong  attachment  of  the 
Finnish nation to the democratic system of governance, its belief that it 
constituted part of a group of states with a superior culture, including an 
acclaimed political culture, its sense of solidarity with the Scandinavians 
represented  an  important  element  of  its  cultural  and  foreign  policy 
identity.48  Assessing Finnish territorial goals in the east, Constantinide 
estimated that at the general peace Finland may ask for Eastern Karelia and 
the Kola Peninsula while being prepared to give up a strip of land situated 
north of Leningrad and alongside the Finnish Gulf so that the town bearing 
the name of the founder of Soviet Union will be out of the range of any gun 
situated on the Finnish territory. The Finns were however worried that the 
Germans will not hand over t he Kola Peninsula, a territory rich in mines 
and wood and that Eastern Karelia seemed bound to remain under German 
administration.49 These diplomatic dispatches prove once again that despite 
the  many  similarities  between  Romania  and  Finland,  differences  als o 
existed  in  terms  of  domestic  regime  (dictatorship  versus  democracy), 
foreign  policy  goals  and  the  pursuit  of  these  goals  (influence  versus 
autonomy). 
Moreover, pursuing their national goals as defined by their elites, 
Romania and Finland presented in a d ifferent light the meaning of their 
war. Repeatedly, the Finns emphasized the local and “private” character of 
their war. The Romanian envoy to Helsinki reported on August 30 that the 
Finns were attempting in their propaganda to treat gently both the Swedes 
and the Russians. The mainstream opinion in Finland understood that their 
country  will  continue  to  neighbour  Russia  and  Sweden  and  therefore 
rejected the mission assigned to her by Germany of being the Great Power 
of the north. Commenting on a conversation between Mannerheim and the 
Romanian military attaché Titus Gârbea, Constantinide remarked that the 
Finnish  Marshal  was  encouraging  the  Romanian  Army  to  continue  its 
attacks on the heart of Russia while reserving the Finnish Army only for 
local  operations,  in  order  to  solely  defend  its  limited  interests.  He 
concluded that “it is obvious that the Finns want to leave options open for 
their future and preserve their army without engaging it in actions that are 
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not directly linked to their interests […]”50 The Romanian envoy seems to 
have interpreted Finnish prudent behaviour coupled with the prompting to 
Romania  to  strike  against  Russia  in  the  sense  of  pulling  someone‟s 
chestnuts out of the fire. 
Although  Finland  could  not  be  won  towards  the  German 
magnificent plans in the north, the relations with Britain will go from crisis 
to crisis in the autumn of 1941 until the state of war will be proclaimed 
between  the  two  traditional  partners.  On  September  22  the  British 
Government  handed  its  Finnish  counterpart  a  memoranda  asking  for 
immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of the troops inside Finnish borders under 
the threat that unless these conditions were fulfilled Britain might decide to 
declare war upon Finland. As correctly interpreted by the Romanian envoy, 
the British memoranda could not but receive a negative answer although, 
paradoxically, Finland was short of reaching its military objectives.51 
The Finnish reply frustrated British expectations, Anthony Eden 
complaining even that the Finns were ungrateful for the Brit ish support 
during the Winter War. In fact, responding to an interpellation in the 
Parliament, Eden had answered on October 1 that his government has 
already  addressed  a  warning  to  the  Finnish  government  through  the 
Norwegian minister in Helsinki 52. This warning stated that if the Finnish 
government persisted in invading purely Russian territory, London will be 
forced to treat Finland as an open enemy, not only during the war but also 
when peace will come to be made. 53 The Soviet envoy to London was also 
putting pressure on the chief of British diplomacy to declare war on 
Finland, Hungary and Romania. 54 Eden emphasized that not only Britain 
but also the United States will be disappointed of the Finnish answer.55 
The United States joined in the effort to convince Finland to end the 
war  against  Soviet  Union.  The  Romanian  charge  d‟affairs  Brutus  Coste 
reported from Washington that according to a press declaration made by 
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Cordell Hull on November 3, the US passed to Finland a Soviet offer for 
opening up  negotiations  based  on  the  returning  by  the  Soviet  Union  to 
Finland  of  the  territories  it  had  annexed  in  1940  and  that  Finland  had 
declined  the  offer.56  The  American  involvement  persevered  with  the 
Finnish envoy being instructed to declare to Helsinki that if Finland desired 
to keep American friendship it had to give palpable proofs that it intended 
to cease its military operations and retreat its troops behind the 1939 
border.  The  American  State  Secretary  noticed  that  Finland  started  its 
advance  against  Murmansk  and  Arch angelsk,  two  destinations  of  the 
American-British  goods  supply  for  the  USSR,  and  warned  that  were 
Finland not to comply with these requests, the conclusion would be that 
either  it  had  lost  its  independence  or  was  simply  pursuing  the  war 
according to the wi ll  of  its  people.  Hull‟s  intervention  was  subject  to 
criticism in the New York Times on the ground that Finland knew that the 
Germans were only one step away from their house while the democracies 
were far away, unable to guarantee its security.57 The Finnish President was 
warned in a letter dated November 6 against the advance of the Finnish 
troops behind the 1939 border.58 
Constantinide was privy to the three memorandums handed over 
by the American envoy to the Finnish President on October 27, 28 and 31. 
The Americans wanted the Finnish military operations to be immediately 
stopped and requested Finland to provide guarantees for the fact that it 
will retreat behind the 1939 borders. The Finnish military campaign side by 
side with Germany was deemed a direct  threat against the safety of the 
United  States.  The  US  also  warned  that  a  Finnish  action  against  the 
American deliveries for Russia will entail immediate consequences. An 
urgent reply was expected from the Finnish Government. The Romanian 
minister received information that the Finnish answer would reproduce in 
a very detailed form the ideas from the memorandum meant for the United 
Kingdom. A rupture of the diplomatic relations between the two countries 
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was not considered unlikely to happen.59 The memorandums puzzled the 
Finnish circles as to the reasons which caused their deliverance to Helsinki. 
Three hypotheses emerged: its delivery came at the instigation of the UK; at 
the request of the USSR; the most plausible one was that it sprang from the 
US desire th at the Finnish troops will not cut the railway Murmansk -
Leningrad, the only line of supply for the USSR after the harbo ur of 
Archangelsk had become impracticable because of the ice.60 
Constantinide estimated the impact of the British and American 
demarches  on  the governmental  circles  as  being  “considerable”.  Finland 
was  attempting  to  avoid  reaching  the  state  of  war  with  the  Anglo-
Americans. This was a result of the belief of both the Finnish Government 
and the public opinion that the war will end in a peace of compromise and 
Finland‟s interests would be best served if it avoided to be drawn in the 
Great Powers war. Secondly, the Finns considered the possibility that the 
state  of  war  with  the  two  Great  Powers  will  affect  on  the  long  run  its 
economic interests. The relations with the two powers made it possible for 
Finland  to  build  up  an  important  wood  and  food  industry  during  the 
previous two decades. They had represented the best commercial partners 
for Finnish products and their banks had granted advantageous credits to 
Finland  without  any  control  being  imposed  upon  these  industries. 
Constantinide understood the dilemma the Finnish authorities were facing 
in  terms  of  economy  and  commerce:  if  Finland  is  forced  to  cooperate 
primarily with the Germans, it will have to grow its capacity of production 
to  the  upper  limit  in  order  to  satisfy  the  Reich‟s  European  needs.  Its 
production would not depend on its capitals or commercial calculations. 
Where capitals lacked, Germany would come to its assistance but under 
German  control.  Germany  would  demand  the  right  of  participating  to 
benefits  and  take  the  control.  This  would  inevitably  denationalize  the 
Finnish  capitals  and  lead  to  the  control  of  the  Finnish  economy.  This 
perspective  worried  to  the  upmost  the  financial  circles,  especially  when 
they  compared  it  with  the  ideal  state  of  affairs  which  had  previously 
permitted the rapid industrialization and enrichment of the country. The 
Romanian minister appreciated that these worries of the economic circles 
were influencing the politicians. A contributory factor in this respect was 
the fact that the President, the PM and the Foreign Minister had previously 
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been bankers who worked a good part of their life in the Anglo-American 
banks. Constantinide concluded that while the Finnish loyal cooperation in 
the war against Russia was safeguarded, the German economic methods 
and plans lacked any sympathy.61 
Gradually,  Romania  and  Finland‟s  relations  with  Britain  were 
heading towards the state of war prompted by Soviet Union. When the 
Finnish envoy in London Georg Gripenberg reported that his Romanian 
colleague Viorel Virgil Tilea had decided to remain in London as a private 
person,  the  Finnish  diplomacy  was  interested  in  the  reasons  which 
determined him to take such a step. Nevertheless, the fact that Tilea was 
condemned  in  contumacy  at  heavy  prison  for  not  obeying  the 
government‟s orders to return to Romania, that he had all his considerable 
fortune  confiscated  and  his  citizenship  withdrawn  proved  the  fact  that 
Tilea‟s decision was in contradiction with his government‟s orders.62 Palin 
strongly denied some assumptions according to which everything was a 
comedy  orchestrated  for  the  Germans  in  order  for  the  Romanians  to 
maintain  their  relations  with  Britain.  Moreover,  Marshal  Antonescu‟s 
determination to pursue a loyal policy towards Germany as well as the 
categorical, bitter and offensive language of the Romanian press towards 
Britain proved that the relations between the two parties had been severed. 
Palin  anticipated,  however,  the  possibility  that  Tilea‟s  remaining  on  his 
own risks in Britain may be useful in case Antonescu‟s pro-Axis policy will 
prove to be a failure.63 
The comprehension of the common interests of the two countries 
made the relation between Romania and Finland develop very rapidly after 
the beginning of the Eastern Campaign. M. Antonescu underlined in his 
instructions to the Romanian envoy in Helsinki of October 6 the excellent 
cooperation and the concerted diplomatic action between the two states. He 
requested the envoy to me et the Finnish Foreign Minister and reiterate 
Romania‟s desire to keep alive this uniform action in the Russian question 
and in the territorial issues by reciprocally informing and supporting their 
programs and attempting to reach a common point of view on all issues. 
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The Romanian vice-PM again emphasized that: “The action of constituting 
the  northern  respectively  the  southern  wings  of  the  Russian  border  is 
imposed  by  the  geography  of  our  permanent  interests.”  The  Romanian 
chief of diplomacy also informed his envoy that he had drafted a program 
in  order  to  hastily  rocket  up  the  Romanian  propaganda  in  Finland.  In 
addition  to  the  political,  cultural  and  propaganda  cooperation,  M. 
Antonescu also envisaged the expansion of the economic relations between 
the two countries. Romania had already placed orders of ammunition and 
war  materials  in  Finland  and  aimed  at  intensifying  the  commercial 
exchanges.64 
In fact, the relation with Finland was part of M. Antonescu‟s grand 
design by which he tried to draw all resources of the European continent 
against Russia. Germany‟s satellites such as Slovakia, Croatia, the Reich‟s 
informal allies such as Finland, Romania and Hungary, the Vichy France 
were considered as being driven by a common interest in achieving the 
Axis plans to bring about the defeat of Russia. For instance, at the end of 
August M. Antonescu approached the French envoy Jacques Truelle with 
regard to what he saw as the Slavic danger and the Russian imperialism. 
Antonescu pointed to Germany‟s superior military power but he did not 
avoid  mentioning  the  great  population  reservoir  at  Russian  disposal. 
Therefore, he drew the conclusion that what was needed was a European 
unified position so as the Russians would not again be able to confront 
Europe with a new danger. Answering his concerns and proposals, Truelle 
pointed to the difficult situation of his country pressed in-between Scylla 
and  Carybda,  namely  the  German  occupation  and  the  British 
uncompromising attitude. Although accepting the fact that an anti-Russian 
program was needed, Truelle did not answer to his interlocutor‟s subtle 
suggestion and even stressed out his opinion that the Balkan Slavs were to 
be compromised with.65 This conversation made plain the rift between the 
two states in this regard which was partly a result of geography. Situated in 
Western Europe, for France the two great powers influencing its external 
environment were Germany and Britain, while Romania, situated on the 
other edge of Europe, was marred by other scenarios. In this respect, 
political geography was important, and while it divided the interests of 
Romania and the Vichy France, it created the solidarity of the Romanian -
Finnish relations. 
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In  his  instructions  for  Helsinki  dictated  on  November  16,  M. 
Antonescu asked Constantinide to approach the Finnish PM and Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs.  He  advanced  to  the  Finnish  officials  the  proposal  of 
sorting out the common interests and issues for peace as soon as possible 
and not leaving this action for the time of peace. He considered that the two 
friendly  governments  had  to  find  in  cooperation  the  political  and 
diplomatic  solutions  for  future  peace,  as  well  as  economic  ways  of 
collaboration.  The  Romanian  vice-PM  transmitted  his  opinion  that  the 
small and lesser European states had to find common formulas to prepare 
themselves for the time when the Great Powers would decide upon the 
final terms of the peace. The Romanian official was particularly interested 
in concrete forms of cooperation between the two countries.66 
In the meantime, by September t he Finnish troops had registered 
important military gains marked by the liberation of the towns of Viipuri 
and Petroskoi, the reaching of Lake Onega and the cutting off of the 
Murmansk  railway.  Thus,  the  Russian  troops,  still  located  in  Eastern 
Karelia, maintained their link with mainland Russia only through the strip 
of land situated in-between Lake Onega and the White Sea. The Finnish 
war  operations,  anticipated  Constantinide,  would  be  directed  towards 
closing this connection and clearing the ground of So viet troops before 
reaching their final war objectives. Eventually, the Finnish Army will adopt 
a defensive stand.67 The frontline will remain stagnant during November, 
but in December the Russians retreated from Hanko thus avoiding the 
turning thereof into a new Gibraltar and allowing the numerous Finnish 
forces to be freed for being used on the main front.68 
When predicting the Finnish war intentions, Constantinide based 
his assumptions on V￤inö Tanner‟s declarations of September 14, which he 
considered  an  accurate  statement  of  Finnish  war  objectives.  The  social-
democratic leader underscored in his speech five principles regarding the 
Finnish pursuit of war: Finland did not intend to conclude a separate peace; 
this country struggled in a local and separate war, not a part of the war 
among the great powers; the Finnish-Soviet war was a continuation of the 
Winter War; it was only by chance in a brotherhood-in-arms relation with 
Germany;  and  as  a  democratic  state,  it  did  not  fight  an  ideological  war 
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against  democracy.  As  the Romanian  envoy  correctly  understood  it,  the 
speech  was  released  because  it  sought  to  deny  the  allegations  about  a 
separate peace Finland was ready to conclude and to alleviate the fears of 
the public opinion that the Finnish Army was going to fight a general war 
against  Russia  whereby  it  might  suffer  additional  casualties,  hunger, 
sufferance and the loss of its democratic edifice. Constantinide claimed in 
his reports that his discussions with German personalities made it clear that 
Germany accepted the Finnish war program and their political democratic 
regime.69 
Facing  common  challenges,  Romania  wanted  to  emphasize  the 
common  attitudes  of  the  two  countries.  Well -acquainted  with  Finnish 
position from the diplomatic reports, Antonescu approached Palin in order 
to point out to the Romanian moderate political behaviour and to ask for 
Finland  as  a  brother -in-arms,  showing  sympathy  to  the  fighting  of 
Romania.70 
The  Finns  used  every  opportunity  to  stress  out  the  separate 
character of their struggle, para llel but not part of the Axis. The Anglo -
American demarches and the prudence of the government gave pace to 
rumours reported by Constantinide in his diplomatic dispatches regarding 
alleged  dissensions  between  Mannerheim,  who  wanted  an  energetic 
continuation of the military operations, and the government willing to 
make all efforts to stop the advance of the armies towards Murmansk and 
St. Petersburg in order not to provoke the Western Powers. 71  Even the 
adherence to the Anticomintern Pact was described by Finnish top officials 
up to foreign minister Witting as only the fulfilment of a formality lacking 
any  political  or  practical  consequences.  Nevertheless,  Constantinide 
anticipated that there were only a few possibilities that Finland will remain 
in this “neutrality” vis-à-vis the Great Powers and sooner or later she will 
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be  forced  to  her  regret  to  choose  sides.72  When in September Roosevelt 
delivered a speech to the youth conference by which he mixed Finland with 
the other allies of Germany that shed the blood  of their youth for Hitler‟s 
ambitions, it was certainly unpleasant for the Finns who for such a long 
time and with such insistence had stressed the separate character of their 
struggle. The Finnish envoy to Bern Tapio Voionmaa, however, reported 
that despite this affirmation, the Swiss press acknowledged the difference 
between the Finnish independent struggle and the war between the Great 
Powers.  The  interest  for  Finland  was  still  alive  as  well  as  the  warm 
sympathy, while the attitude towards Hungary or Romania was cool.73 This 
report thus contrasted the foreign policy lines of Finland and Romania, 
again emphasizing Helsinki‟s cautious, autonomous orientation. 
The  nature  of  the  two  countries‟  relations  with  Germany  was  a 
matter of interest and analysis for their diplomatic representatives. Palin 
was  astonished  by  a  speech  of  Manfred  von  Killinger  of  October  1941 
regarding the treatment of the German minority in Romania. He noticed 
the  uncovered  way  in  which  the  Germans  understood  to  support 
Antonescu and to encourage the participation of the Romanians in the war. 
In  tackling  in  his  speech  topics  such  as  the  war,  the  economic  relations 
between the two states, the oil and political issues, von Killinger unveiledly 
interfered in the Romanian domestic life. The speech produced bitterness in 
the  opposition  circles  while  the  governmental  circles  assessed  his 
statements as reflecting the friendly feelings of the German envoy towards 
Romania.74 This was a price Romania, as a small and lesser country, was 
compelled to pay for gaining influence on the international arena. Palin‟s 
surprise highlighted once more the differences between the two countries‟ 
choices in their foreign policy. 
Despite  some  incongruence  in  their  foreign  policy  lines,  the  two 
foreign  ministries  continued  to  obey  their  gentlemen‟s  agreement 
regarding  the  reciprocal  information  and  cooperation  as  regards  the 
developments  taking  place  on  the  international  arena.  The  German 
                                                 
72 Constantinide‟s report no. 221 of 5.12.1941 to Mihai Antonescu, AMAE 71 Finlanda, vol. 
13, 59-63. 
73 „In such infortunate countries as Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Italy, whose 
governments have found it necessary to submit to Hitler and to do his biddings, the 
quislings have organized youth movements too – but those are only movements of the 
youth by the tens of thousands to the slaughter of the eastern front where the Nazis need 
cannon fodder in their desperate attempts to shatter the stalwart Russian Army‟, see 
Voionmaa‟s dispatch no. 46 of 15.09.1942, UA 5C 31. 
74 Palin‟s report no. 34 of 8.10.1941. UA, 5, C 14 From “allies without alliance” to concerted action: Romania and Finland in the aftermath of the 
Operation Barbarossa (1941) 
 
  277 
government‟s proposal of joining the Anti-Comintern Pact75 was judged by 
Finland and Romania according to their own interests, but they kept each 
other privy to their decision -making process. Accordingly, Raoul Bossy 
reported  on  November  18  from  Berlin  that  his Finnish  colleague had 
informed him on the fact that the Finnish Government di d not adopt a 
decision regarding this proposal, first made by Japan in the summer. His 
Finnish  colleague  anticipated  however  that  because  the  pact  did  not 
represent a treaty of alliance but an anti -Bolshevik manifestation, it was 
hard for his government to  refuse to do so. If the invitation would have 
regarded instead the adhesion to the Tripartite Pact 76 the Finnish envoy 
anticipated that his Government would have refused to accept it as his 
country did not want to join a political constellation but to defe nd its own 
interests.  The  Finnish  envoy  also quoted  a  German high  official  who 
pointed out to the difference between Romanian and Finnish stands vis -à-
vis Germany: “Finland fights for her borders and her struggle is parallel 
with ours, while Romania fights for the common cause and we struggle 
shoulder by shoulder the same war.”77 
In the decision-making process for joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, 
M. Antonescu insisted on being informed on the Finnish position before 
practically adhering to it due to the fact that Germany had pointed out to 
him Finland‟s acceptance of the German invitation. The Romanian vice-PM 
was  not  very  happy  about  German  government‟s  proposition.78  Palin 
confirmed on November 22 on behalf of foreign minister Witting the fact 
that his country had indeed agreed to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. 
Palin also conveyed his foreign minister‟s wish to meet the Romanian vice-
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PM  in  Berlin  and  approach  in  their  conversation  the  international 
situation.79 
The meeting between M. Antonescu and Witting, the only such high 
level summit between the two states‟ officials in the course of the war, took 
place on November 27 in Berlin occasioned by the two countries‟ adhering 
to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The conversation of the two foreign ministers 
touched upon the international situation and on the relations between the 
two states. A special attention was paid to the Romanian-Finnish concerted 
attitude  regarding  Russia  by  means  of  which  the  two  leaders  of  the 
diplomacies  emphasized  their  common  stand.  They  referred  to  the 
initiative of M. Antonescu to get closer to Finland after the Finnish-Soviet 
war broke out on June 25. No new agreements were reached during the 
discussion,  but  the  two  chiefs  of  diplomacies  have  clearly  stated  their 
desire  to  intensify  the  political  intimacy  between  their  states,  Witting 
pointing once more to their identity of interests. Furthermore, the Finnish 
foreign minister highly appreciated Palin‟s efforts in this direction. Witting 
also  pledged  himself  to  provide  M.  Antonescu  with  all  the  important 
Finnish data, information and decisions in order for the consultation with 
Romania to be able to generate a common viewpoint of the two countries, 
regarding the territorial questions as well as  the Russian issues. They also 
pledged to remain loyal friends.80 
On  his  return  from  Berlin,  M.  Antonescu  invited  Palin  to  the 
Foreign  Ministry  in  order  to  express  his  satisfaction  in  what  the 
conversation  with Witting  was  concerned.  The  vice -PM  also  informed 
about his interviews with Hitler in which Finnish issues were approached, 
with Hitler displaying a great deal of respect for Finland‟s just cause and 
assuring  that  all  her  desires  in  the  new  Europe  will  be  fulfilled. 
Furthermore,  Antonescu  spoke  again  about  the  parallelism  between 
Romania and Finland.81 
The Finnish joining the Pact took place without any enthusiasm 
being  displayed  by  the  Finnish  authorities,  whereby  the  latter  even 
underlined that this was a mere formality. 82  In contrast, the Romanian 
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press  was  more  enthusiastic  about  the  consolidation  of  the  Romanian-
German relations as a result of this adherence. 
The  two  states  informed  each  other  regarding  their  positions 
towards  the  British ultimatum  delivered  to  them. M.  Antonescu  tackled 
this issue with Palin on November 31.83 A week later Palin approached the 
foreign  minister  on  the  same  issue  underlining  the  similarity  of  the 
responses of the two states to the British ultimatum. 84  According to his 
dispatch  to  Helsinki,  M.  Antonescu  read  him  during  the  interview  a 
document  according  to  which  Romania‟s  engagement  in  the  war 
represented  a  defensive  struggle  against  the  Soviet  aggression  that  had 
started back in 1940. Romania‟s request for Dniester as the eastern border 
was once again stressed and it was this aim that made it impossible for the 
Romanians to accede to British demands. The document accused Britain for 
not fulfilling her extensive promises for guarantees.85 
Britain‟s  war  declaration  against  Finland,  Romania  and  Hungary 
was the outcome of these months of tensions. The war declaration against 
Finland  was  commented  by  the  Romanian  press.  Timpul  published  an 
article about the séance of annual closing of Eduskunta in which President 
Ryti had observed that the front with the Red Army had become calm and 
that despite his country‟s efforts to preserve peace Britain had declared war 
on Finland and started a propaganda campaign against it. Ryti contrasted 
British attitude to that of Germany, Italy and Hungary who, in a difficult 
alimentary situation, had granted a big help to his country.86 
The Japanese surprise attack on the American bases in the Pacific 
and the war declarations of Axis countries against the US brought the 
greatest financial power of the world in the war on the side of the UK and 
the USSR. If the Romanian and Finnish position as regards t he British 
ultimatums  resembled  to  a  large  extent,  their  attitude  in  this  respect 
differed. Palin made it clear to M. Antonescu that there could be no 
agreement between Romania and Finland in this respect as his country was 
not a signatory of the Tripartit e Pact and considered  itself free from any 
obligations to this effect.87 
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The end of 1941 brought with it the halt of German offensive and 
the failure of the Wehrmacht‟s ambition to defeat the Soviet Union in a 
blitzkrieg.  This  fed  the  rumours  that  Finland  was  suing  for  a  separate 
peace. In order to convince the Romanian side of the absurdity of these 
allegations,  the  Finnish  envoy  read  in  presence  of  M.  Antonescu  a 
confidential note by means of which the Finnish President and his Foreign 
Minister informed the Romanian Government that Finland had never taken 
into consideration the idea of a separate peace. The note stated that Finland 
was  prepared  to  adhere  spiritually  to  some  of  the  European 
transformations. The country had joined the German struggle in order to 
save her territory and existence and a struggle for honour only ends with a 
peace of honour. The note also stressed that the action of concert between 
the  two  states  initiated  by  M.  Antonescu  and  agreed  upon  by  the  two 
countries had remained as a directive of the Finnish Government.88 
Another issue of interest for the two countries was the plans for the 
1942  military  campaign.  Palin  reported  from  Bucharest  that  in  the 
aftermath  of  its  bloody  occupation  of  Odessa 89,  Romania  intended  to 
demobilize round 30% of her existing forces, to continue taking part in the 
war with six brigades, while four -five divisions will remain as forces of 
occupation over the Dniester. These troops supplemented the forces to be 
maintained at the border with Hungary. Half of the ef fective was to be 
accorded supplementary instructions with the help of the Germans in 
Moldova.90 Indeed, the end of the campaign in Odessa appeared to signal 
the end of the large -scale participation of the Romanian troops on the 
eastern front. This was further augmented by the referendum organized by 
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Marshal Antonescu in October in which he asked the people‟s opinion of 
his leadership.91 
Given the shared interest of the two parties for their future military 
plans, an exchange of views took place in Bucharest  and Helsinki.  M. 
Antonescu informed the Finns in the second half of November of the 
Romanian government‟s intention to stop taking part alongside Germany 
in the campaign of further east. Yet he pointed out that though a gradual 
demobilization of the army was envisaged – the demobilization of 200,000 
men had already taken place – the Romanian troops will remain as troops 
of  occupation  in  the  regions  of  Transnistria  and  Odessa.92  The Finnish 
Foreign Ministry also informed that the Finnish intention was to ret urn to 
the borders of 1939, a territory where it had already introduced normal 
civil  administration,  whereas  the  captured  territories  over  the  former 
border were maintained under military administration.93 Mannerheim also 
answered to Romanian preoccupations   with the Finnish military future 
plans  by  letting  Antonescu  know  that  the  Finnish  High  Command 
intended, after the capture of St. Petersburg, to discharge the recruits of the 
older age classes while the members of the younger age classes will remain 
as troops of occupation.94 
 
Conclusions 
This  study  leads  to  two  main  conclusions.  First,  the  relations 
between the two states headed from the statute of “allies without alliance” 
relationship based on balance of power towards joint decision in some 
areas although these pledges were only partly fulfilled due to undesirable 
war  evolutions.  The  shift  from  balance  of  power  towards  joint  decision 
started in July with the action of concert proposed by M. Antonescu and 
speeded  in  September  by  the Finnish  final  approval  of  the scheme.  The 
impulse of cooperating on these grounds came to Romania and Finland 
consented  more  or  less  enthusiastically.  In  their  main  advocate  M. 
Antonescu‟s conception, the relations with Finland were part of a grand 
design aimed at strengthening the influence and small and lesser states at 
the  future  peace  conference  to  be  open  in  the  aftermath  of  a  German 
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victory. His conception was shared, at least insofar as the reconfiguration of 
Russian polity is concerned, by some of the most influential members of the 
Finnish political elite such as President Ryti and foreign minister Witting 
and by the envoy to Bucharest Palin. Nevertheless, the Finnish side was 
generally more prudent in handling these issues, both due to the different 
political regime and to some differences in the war strategies and aims of 
the two countries. 
 
 
Second,  while  both  countries  were  facing  the  small  and  lesser 
powers  dilemma  by  not  being  capable  to  exercise  influence  on  the 
international arena simultaneously maintaining their autonomy of decision, 
Romania placed more emphasis on striving for influence and Finland on 
aiming to maintain its autonomy. While Finland was mostly driven in her 
pursuit of war by the desire to regain its lost territories and to shorten the 
frontier with Russia in order to ease its defence, Romania‟s strivings only 
partly  overlapped  with  those  of  the  Nordic  country.  In  addition  to  the 
reintegration of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina and to the occupation of 
Transnistria, Romania‟s primary aim was the reintegration of “the heart” of 
Romania, the part of Transylvania lost to Hungary with Axis‟ help. Only 
the main author of this decision, i.e. Germany, was considered capable of 
reversing  it,  and  therefore  Bucharest  wanted  to  influence  Berlin  in  this 
regard. Hitler was aware of this and therefore he skilfully played Romania 
and Hungary against each other. Moreover, as a democratic country with a 
larger measure of consensus, Hitler did not possess such a lever against 
Finland as he did in the case of Romania where he maintained the extreme 
Fig. 2 Cooperation between Romania and Finland (1941)
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right legionnaires in reserve in case the Romanian government failed to 
raise to his expectations. Thus, Finland was able to avoid declaring war 
against the US as opposed to Romania. Despite these differences, Finland 
also attempted to increase its influence in Berlin and Romania to preserve 
its autonomy, but the emphasis is different.   
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